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This article discusses the so-called fourth instance doctrine under Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, focusing in particular on its role 
in fair trial cases. It attempts to determine when the European Court of 
Human Rights has given weight to the fourth instance doctrine. Owing to the 
dynamic and free-range nature of the Court’s interpretative methods, 
challenges are often mounted on the basis of the fourth instance doctrine and 
the interpretation of Article 6 (fair trial). This article examines the case law, 
amounting to forty-four cases, on the provision of fair trials. It divides the role 
of the fourth instance doctrine into four distinct categories: (1) ‘clear fourth 
instance nature’; (2) ‘length of proceedings’; (3) ‘balancing approach’; and (4) 
‘disregard of fourth instance approach’. Lastly, the article evaluates whether 
or not the application of strict fourth instance doctrine arguments in fair trial 
cases can be justified.  
  
Keywords:  
ECHR, ECtHR, fourth instance doctrine, right to a fair trial, effective 
interpretation. 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 85 
II. ARTICLE 6 AND THE FOURTH INSTANCE DOCTRINE ..................................... 92 
 Interpretation of Article 6 ..................................................................... 92 1.
 The Fourth Instance Doctrine .............................................................. 94 2.
III. CASE STUDY: THE ROLE OF THE FOURTH INSTANCE DOCTRINE ................. 97 
 Case Categories ...................................................................................... 97 1.
 Category one: Clear fourth instance nature .......................................... 99 2.
 Category two: Length of proceedings .................................................. 101 3.
 Category three: Balancing approach ................................................... 103 4.
 Category Four: Disregard of Fourth Instance Approach ................... 108 5.
IV. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................. 115 
                                                            
* M. Sc. (constitutional law), E.MA (human rights and democratisation), PhD 
candidate and lecturer in Constitutional Law at the University of Eastern Finland 
Law School. E-Mail: maija.dahlberg@uef.fi. I wish to extend my sincere thanks to 
Prof. Jaakko Husa, Prof. Toomas Kotkas, Judge, Docent, LLD Mirjami Paso, and 
the anonymous reviewers for the valuable comments and guidance. All mistakes and 
omissions remain my own responsibility. 
85   European Journal of Legal Studies                [Vol.7 No.2 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European legal system, in which the European Court of Human 
Rights (‘the Court’) is situated, rests on the principle of subsidiarity to 
a great extent. This means that the Contracting States are responsible 
for enforcing the rights and freedoms protected under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’). The fourth instance 
doctrine constitutes the principle of subsidiarity1 and adheres to it on 
the basis that the Contracting States are the main actors under the 
Convention. Under the fourth instance doctrine the Court does not 
address errors of fact or law allegedly made by a national court, unless 
and insofar as such errors infringe the rights and freedoms protected 
by the Convention.2 
 
The Court regularly invokes the principle of subsidiarity and its 
doctrinal corollary, the margin of appreciation doctrine.3 The latter 
means that States are allowed a certain margin for discretion in order 
to take into account the special circumstances of each State. It has 
been stated that in order to maintain its institutional credibility, the 
Court must refrain from interfering with the margin of appreciation 
granted to Contracting States. 4  One might assume that the fourth 
                                                            
1  See Herbert Petzold, ‘The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity’, in 
Ronald St J Macdonald, Franz Matscher and Herbert Petzold (eds), The European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993), 41-62. 
2 Jonas Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009), 257-76.  
3 These principles also form part of the Convention, and are not only based on the 
case law of the Court. See Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CETS No. 213) which 
adds the principle of subsidiarity to the Preamble of the Convention (‘Affirming 
that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 
have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this 
Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of 
appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Human Rights established by this Convention.’). Protocol No. 15 was opened for 
signature on 24 June 2013 and will enter into force as soon as all State Parties to the 
Convention have signed and ratified it. On the margin of appreciation doctrine, see, 
eg Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia 2001). 
4 Magdalena Forowicz, The Reception of International Law in the European Court of 
Human Rights (OUP 2010), 3-4. Furthermore, the margin of appreciation has been 
seen as a method that hinders the reception of international law in the ECHR 
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instance principle, the margin of appreciation and the principle of 
subsidiarity reflect different aspects of the Court’s competence, as 
there would otherwise be no need for the three different principles. It 
has, however, been argued that they are essentially synonymous. 
Christoffersen stresses that the different concepts are generally 
confined to separate areas of case law, but it would be a mistake to 
assume that this makes any substantive difference.5 
 
That said, I contend that there is a distinction to be drawn between 
these three principles. The principle of subsidiarity, the margin of 
appreciation doctrine and the fourth instance doctrine represent 
different aspects of national sovereignty. 6  In other words, national 
sovereignty lies at the heart of these principles, but the approach 
differs in each case. The fourth instance doctrine relates to the 
question of whether it is possible to appeal a national court’s decision, 
while the subsidiarity principle has a broader meaning.7 As Carozza 
states, the principle of subsidiarity needs a broad formulation and 
there are several layers within the principle.8 Consequently, I argue 
that the fourth instance doctrine belongs to the first layer of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
system (ibid, 7-9). 
5 Christoffersen (n 2), 239-40; see also Petzold (n 1) and Paul Mahoney, ‘Universality 
Versus Subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Case Law on Free Speech: Explaining Some 
Recent Judgments’ (1997) EHRLR 364-79. Cf. Sweeney sees the margin of 
appreciation doctrine as separate but closely connected to the principle of 
subsidiarity (James A. Sweeney, The European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold 
Era: Universality in Transition (Routledge 2013), 33); Breitenmoser also makes a 
distinction between the margin of appreciation doctrine and subsidiarity principle, 
Stephan Breitenmoser, ‘Subsidiarität und Intressenabwägung im Rahmen der 
EGMR-Rechtsprechung’, in Stephan Breitenmoser and others (eds), Human Rights, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law, Liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (Dike Verlag 2007) 
119-42. 
6 See, also, Paolo Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a structural principle of international 
human rights law’ ((2003) 97 AJIL 38-79, at 69-70) who describes several important 
differences between the margin of appreciation doctrine and subsidiarity principle. 
Carozza also points out that many use the term subsidiarity principle to refer 
generally to the idea of deferring decisions to local authorities. 
7 The admissibility criteria concretise the subsidiarity principle: Article 35(1) of the 
Convention provides that the Court can only hear cases when the applicant has 
exhausted all available national remedies. The subsidiarity principle is also known 
in EU law, but its content differs from that applied in the Convention system. See 
on the subsidiarity principle in EU law, Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU 
Law (2nd edn; OUP 2006), 183-8. 
8 Carozza (n 6), 57-8. 
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subsidiarity principle. In this layer local communities are left to protect 
and respect human rights, provided they are capable of achieving those 
ends themselves. Also the margin of appreciation doctrine belongs to 
the first layer. In this case, the subsidiarity principle gives the national 
authorities a degree of discretion over the interpretation and 
implementation of Convention rights and freedoms.9 
 
The difference between the fourth instance doctrine and the margin of 
appreciation doctrine is rather complex. In practice, the difference is 
often a matter of degree; both doctrines allow considerable discretion 
to the national authorities.10 The discernable difference that sets them 
apart is that the argumentation in cases concerning the margin of 
appreciation doctrine is more extensive than the argumentation in 
fourth instance cases. 11  For this reason, compared to the fourth 
instance doctrine, the margin of appreciation doctrine has a more 
developed body of case law and is more often used in the Court’s 
praxis. 
 
The central difference is that the margin of appreciation doctrine is 
linked to argumentation by consensus. In short, the margin of 
appreciation is concerned with whether there is a consensus between 
the states, or not. If there is consensus, then the margin will be 
narrower and when there is no consensus, then the margin afforded to 
the states is wider. By contrast, there is no such tool to measure the 
scope of application of the fourth instance doctrine.12 Furthermore, the 
                                                            
9  The second layer of subsidiarity supports the integration of local and 
supranational interpretation and implementation into a single community of 
discourse. The third and final layer of subsidiarity is founded on the idea that to the 
extent that local bodies are unable to accomplish the ends of human rights, the 
larger branches of international community have a responsibility to intervene, ibid 
58. 
10 David Harris and others, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn; 
OUP 2014), 16. 
11 See the Court’s argumentation of the margin of appreciation doctrine eg S.A.S v. 
France, 43835/11, 1 July 2014, GC, paras 123-59 and compare it to the argumentation 
with the fourth instance doctrine eg Tautkus v Lithuania, 29474/09, 27 November 2012, 
para 57. 
12 The existence of consensus will, however, not automatically restrict the margin of 
appreciation of the state concerned. Much depends on the circumstances of the case 
and especially on the question of whether a particularly important facet of an 
individual’s existence or identity is at stake. See more e.g. Egbert Myjer, ‘Pieter van 
Dijk and His Favourite Strasbourg Judgment. Some Remarks on Consensus in the 
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application of the margin of appreciation doctrine is more detailed and 
precise in the Court’s case law. The extent of the margin is closely 
evaluated, whereas the fourth-instance nature of the case is evaluated 
in a rather rough and brief manner. The fourth instance doctrine 
focuses its evaluation on whether the complaint, which concerns the 
national proceedings, contains elements that are of a fourth-instance 
nature. In other words, it evaluates if the claim that the decision of the 
national proceedings was erroneous. The fourth instance doctrine 
usually concerns Article 6 cases, while the margin of appreciation 
doctrine concerns every Article in the Convention, especially Articles 8, 
9, 10 and 11.13 
 
The fourth instance doctrine is also applied by other quasi-judicial and 
judicial bodies, which employ human rights to determine the 
admissibility of a complaint. Phrases such as ‘this commission/court 
will not sit as a court of fourth instance over domestic legal decisions’ 
are typically seen in such situations.14 These phrases mean that the 
international forum is not to act as a quasi-appellate court as to the 
correctness of a national court’s judgment under its national law. This 
fourth-instance formula states briefly that the international forum will 
not second-guess the national court’s findings of fact or whether the 
national court has applied national law properly.15 
 
The Court has proved itself to be a dynamic and far-reaching 
interpreter of the provisions of the Convention. It has adopted several 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ in Marjolein van Roosmalen and 
others (eds), Fundamental Rights and Principles, Liber amicorum Pieter van Dijk 
(Intersentia 2013) 49-71, at 65; see also Harris and others (n 10), 11. 
13 Harris and others (n 10), 14-6. 
14 See, eg Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1763/2008, Pillai v Canada, 
Views adopted on 25 March 2011, para 11.2; Communication No. 1881/2009, Masih v 
Canada, Views adopted on 24 July 2013, dissenting opinion of Committee member 
Mr Shany, joined by Committee members Mr Flinterman, Mr Kälin, Sir Rodley, Ms 
Seibert-Fohr and Mr Vardezelashvili, para 2; Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (I/A Court H.R.) Case No. 12.683, Melba del Carmen Suárez Peralta v Ecuador, 
26 January 2012, para 83; Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I/A Court H.R.) 
Case No. 12.004, Marco Bienvenido Palma Mendoza et al. v Ecuador, 24 February 2011, 
para 53. 
15 See H. Victor Condé, A Handbook of International Human Rights Terminology (2nd 
edn; University of Nebraska Press 2004), 91-2; Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary 
(3rd edn; OUP 2013), 20-1. 
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methods of interpretation, which emphasise the Convention’s 
objectives, as well as its ‘living’ nature and responsiveness to social 
change.16 However, it regularly reminds states that it does not possess 
de jure power to revise the Convention, although it increasingly appears 
to consider that it has an important oracular, rights-creating function.17 
This often gives rise to a contradiction between the Court’s 
interpretations and the fourth instance doctrine, since it has been 
argued that its far-reaching interpretations encroach on the sphere of 
national authorities.18 
 
In sum, it has been argued that the Court must, on the one hand, 
protect fundamental rights to the highest degree possible and must do 
so in a dynamic and progressive way. On the other hand, it must take 
due account of its position as a supranational court for 47 different 
States, whose opinions on fundamental issues may vary dramatically.19 
The Court’s interpretation of the Convention provides a basis to 
evaluate its role in general and, consequently, to evaluate questions of 
legitimacy in particular, and whether its jurisdiction in relation to 
national courts is justified.20 I argue that the Court’s reasoning takes 
centre stage and that it either gains or loses its legitimacy on the basis 
of its judicial interpretations. 
 
                                                            
16 See Franz Matscher, ‘Methods of Interpretation of the Convention’, in Ronald St J 
Macdonald, Franz Matscher and Herbert Petzold (eds), The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993), 63-81; Ed Bates, The 
Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From its Inception to the Creation 
of a Permanent Court of Human Rights (OUP 2010), 319-58; George Letsas, A Theory of 
Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2009). 
17 See Alex Stone Sweet and Helen Keller, A Europe of Rights (OUP 2008), 6. 
18 For more on this tension, see eg Wilhelmina Thomassen, ‘Judicial Legitimacy in 
an Internationalized World’, in Nick Huls, Maurice Adams and Jacco Bomhoff (eds), 
The Legitimacy of Highest Courts’ Rulings (T.M.C. Asser Press 2009) 399-406, 402. 
19 It must be noted that there will be 48 Contracting Parties after the European 
Union accedes to the European Convention on Human Rights. The accession 
became a legal obligation under the Treaty of Lisbon, see Article 6(2) of the 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/1. Janneke 
Gerards, ‘Judicial Deliberations in the European Court of Human Rights’, in Nick 
Huls, Maurice Adams and Jacco Bomhoff (eds), The Legitimacy of Highest Courts’ 
Rulings (T.M.C. Asser Press 2009) 407-36, 429. 
20 Marc Bossuyt, ‘Should the Strasbourg Court Exercise More Self-Restraint? On the 
extension of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights to social 
security regulations’, 28 HRLJ (2007) 321; Luzius Wildhaber, ‘A Constitutional 
Future for the European Court of Human Rights?’ 23 HRLJ (2002) 161. 
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This article surveys the case law on fair trial cases with specific 
reference to Article 6 of the Convention, which directly requires the 
Court to evaluate fourth instance questions in the context of 
procedural human rights interpretations, an approach not taken 
elsewhere in the Convention. The focus is on the tensions and 
problems involved in balancing the fourth instance doctrine against an 
expansive interpretative approach of the right to a fair trial. This article 
has two aims. Firstly, it endeavours to systematise the role of the fourth 
instance doctrine in fair trial cases. Secondly, it conducts a critical 
evaluation of the justifiability of the fourth instance doctrine in these 
cases. 
 
The evaluation of the justifiability of the fourth instance doctrine leads 
to an analysis of the Court’s argumentation. The justification of a legal 
decision has been divided according to the internal justification and 
external justification. The internal justification relates to the 
consistency of the deliberation and the judicial reasoning but does not 
address why one fact is considered relevant, while another is deemed 
irrelevant and is therefore ignored.21 The external justification means 
that the judge must justify the chosen norm and the substance given to 
that norm. He or she must also decide which facts are taken into 
account—in other words, which facts are legally relevant—and justify 
their choice.22 Justifiability implies that a person faced with a practical 
statement can ask ‘why’ there was an Article 6 violation in the first 
place, and therefore demand reasons that support such a finding.23 
This article concentrates on the external justification, which has been 
characterised as an attempt to achieve comprehensive, general 
legitimacy for a judgment.24 In context of the Convention, justification 
means that the reasoning must be transparent and that all competing 
interests must be taken into account, thereby incorporating pro and 
contra types of argumentation. Moreover, since it is a human rights 
Convention, the focus should be on the content of the rights in dispute 
and not only procedural aspects. This also applies when evaluating the 
                                                            
21 On internal justification, see Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation, The 
Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification (trs by Ruth Adler and Neil 
MacCormick, Clarendon Press 1989), 220-30; Alexander Peczenik, On Law and 
Reason (2nd ed; Springer 2009), 158-9.   
22 On external justification, see Alexy (n 21), 228-30; Peczenik (n 21), 158-60. 
23 Peczenik (n 21), 44-5, 166. 
24 Mirjami Paso, ‘Rhetoric Meets Rational Argumentation Theory’ 2 Ratio Juris 27 
(2014) 236, 239. 
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justifiability of the fourth instance doctrine in the Court’s case law. 
 
Methods borrowed from the theory of rational argumentation are used 
in analysing the relevant case law, and reveal a clear tension owing to 
the Court’s inconsistency in its decisions on the breadth of domestic 
obligations and the extensiveness of fair trial rights. The Court usually 
takes either the fourth instance doctrine or the right to a fair trial into 
account in its judicial reasoning, while leaving all other considerations 
aside. The question of legitimacy is involved in both instances. The 
fourth instance doctrine refers to formal legitimacy.25 It acts as a brake 
on the Court’s interpretations of the Convention by ensuring that it 
bears in mind the constitutional limits on its competence. From the 
fourth instance viewpoint, legitimacy is assessed in terms of formality, 
focusing on procedural steps as opposed to substance. If all the 
required procedural steps are taken at the national level, then no 
criticism is required. Consequently, the Court guarantees its own 
legitimacy through a formalistic approach in which it pays attention to 
procedural requirements only. By contrast, the legitimacy question 
manifests itself differently when it comes to the interpretation of rights, 
in which the Court’s legitimacy is viewed from the opposite position. 
As Letsas has recently argued the living instrument interpretation does 
not threaten the legitimacy of the Court. On the contrary, the Court 
loses legitimacy without it.26 Legitimacy in this sense stresses substance, 
which means that the Court gains legitimacy by evaluating issues of 
content as opposed to purely procedural matters. It is not enough for 
the national authorities to take all necessary procedural steps, since the 
focus in this approach is on the content of these procedures. The 
Court’s reasoning in respect of the fourth instance doctrine is viewed 
from a substantive legitimacy viewpoint. 
 
Section 2 of this contribution outlines the scope and interpretation of 
Article 6 and the fourth instance doctrine in the Court’s practice. 
Section 3 surveys the case law and categorises the judgments relating 
                                                            
25 For more on formal legitimacy, see Thomassen, (n 18), 402-3; Tom Barkhuysen 
and Michiel van Emmerik, ‘Legitimacy of European Court of Human Rights 
Judgments: Procedural Aspects’, in Nick Huls, Maurice Adams and Jacco Bomhoff 
(eds), The Legitimacy of Highest Courts’ Rulings (T.M.C. Asser Press 2009), 437-49. 
26 George Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument: its Meaning and Legitimacy’ 
in Andreas Føllesdal, Birgit Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe, The 
European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context 
(Cambridge University Press 2013), 126, 141. 
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to the fourth instance doctrine in fair trial cases into four groups. This 
categorisation reveals that a strict approach to the fourth instance 
doctrine could threaten the effective protection of the right to a fair 
trial. Therefore, in Section 4, a more flexible and practical approach to 
the fourth instance doctrine is suggested. 
 
II. ARTICLE 6 AND THE FOURTH INSTANCE DOCTRINE  
 
 Interpretation of Article 6 1.
While Article 6(2) and 6(3) contain specific provisions setting out 
minimum rights applicable in respect of those charged with a criminal 
offence, Article 6(1) applies both to civil and criminal proceedings. The 
core of Article 6(1) is the following passage:  
 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. 
 
Article 6 is the provision of the Convention most frequently invoked by 
applicants.27 Many of the terms used in Article 6(1) bear autonomous 
meaning and require interpretation. There is consequently substantial 
case law on the provision’s application and the Court has identified 
separate requirements and positive obligations that derive from it. This 
contribution restricts itself to presenting only the main requirements 
derived from the provision.  
 
From the early 1970s, the Court has held that Article 6(1) includes a 
universal right to access to justice, even though this is not expressly 
stated in the Article.28 The Court also made it clear that ‘civil rights 
and obligations’ have an autonomous meaning under the Convention 
and this concept may also extend to administrative and executive 
decision-making.29 Furthermore, the requirement of a fair trial ‘by an 
                                                            
27 In 2000, almost 70 per cent of all new applications included at least one complaint 
under Article 6. The Court no longer keeps these kinds of statistics but it is likely 
that the proportion is still broadly the same. Some indicators provide that in 2012 
there were in total 480 violations of Article 6 (there were 1,093 violations in total). 
See statistics from the Court’s website: www.echr.coe.int. 
28 Golder v the United Kingdom, 4451/70, 21 February 1975; Posti and Rahko v Finland, 
27824/95, 24 September 2002. 
29 Pellegrin v France, 28541/95, 8 December 1999, GC; Vilho Eskelinen and Others v 
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independent and impartial tribunal established by law’ is the Court’s 
definition of the meaning of impartiality (the prior involvement of a 
judge, objective impartiality),30 independence (administrative agencies 
and disciplinary bodies)31 and the term ‘established by law’.32 Article 6(1) 
also requires that such determinations must be made in a ‘fair and 
public hearing’. Publicity is seen as one of the guarantees of a fair 
trial.33 In addition to this, while absent from the Convention, fairness 
has been held to require ‘equality of arms’.34  
 
The Court has also held that a ‘fair and public hearing’ includes the 
right to examine witnesses,35 the right to legal representation,36 the 
right not to incriminate oneself37, and the requirement that national 
courts must give sufficient reasons for their decisions.38 Article 6(1) also 
provides that everyone is entitled to a hearing ‘within a reasonable 
time’. There have been numerous cases on the promptness of 
proceedings.39 It is possible to waive some, but probably not all, of 
these rights under Article 6(1).40 The scope of the rights guaranteed 
under Article 6 is therefore rather wide and is constantly being refined 
and redefined within the Convention system. It is impossible to 
provide an exhaustive list of the rights contained in Article 6 since the 
Court’s decisions constantly create new rights and shape old ones. Its 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Finland, 63235/00, 19 April 2007, GC.  
30 Fey v Austria, 14396/88, 24 February 1993; AB Kurt Kellermann v Sweden, 41579/98, 
26 October 2004. 
31 Belilos v Switzerland, 10328/83, 29 April 1988; Incal v. Turkey, 22678/93, 9 June 1998, 
GC. 
32 Oleksandr Volkov v Ukraine, 21722/11, 9 January 2013. 
33 Pretto and Others v Italy, 7984/77, 8 December 1983. See also on the sub-rights 
derived from the right to a fair hearing, Eva Brems, ‘Conflicting Human Rights: An 
Exploration in the Context of the Right to a Fair Trial in the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ 1 Human Rights 
Quarterly 27 (2005) 294, 295-8. 
34 Dombo Beheer B.V. v the Netherlands, 14448/88, 27 October 1993. 
35  Van Mechelen and Others v the Netherlands, 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93 and 
22056/93, 23 April 1997. 
36 Granger v the United Kingdom, 11932/86, 28 March 1990. 
37 Saunders v the United Kingdom, 19187/91, 17 December 1996, GC. 
38  Hadjianastassiou v Greece, 12945/87, 16 December 1992; Van de Hurk v the 
Netherlands, 16034/90, 19 April 1994. 
39 Zimmermann and Steiner v Switzerland, 8737/79, 13 July 1983; König v Germany, 
6232/73, 28 June 1978; Bottazzi v Italy, 34884/97, 28 July 1999. 
40  Zumtobel v Austria, 12235/86, 21 September 1993; Jones v the United Kingdom, 
30900/02, 9 September 2003. 
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interpretations have, arguably, moved away from the original text of 
the fair trial provision. 
 
As this brief overview of the progressive content of Article 6 
demonstrates, the Court has developed several tools and techniques to 
underpin its extension of rights and freedoms provided for in the 
Convention. The most frequently cited methods of interpretation are 
as follows: (1) the living-instrument approach; (2) the theory of 
autonomous concepts; (3) the practical and effective approach; and (4) 
the common ground method.41 All these interpretative methods were 
created by the Court’s case law. Furthermore, all the decisions reached 
in these cases reject the idea that the rights enshrined in the 
Convention must be interpreted like they were in the 1950s. Article 1 of 
the Convention is the starting point for the Court’s interpretation, and 
states the following: ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section 1 of this Convention.’  
 
It is noteworthy that the Court’s approach to interpretation, taken as a 
whole, can be described as creative and dynamic. It abandoned the 
strict textual approach to interpretation some time ago and advanced 
special methods of interpretation.42   
 
 The Fourth Instance Doctrine 2.
The fourth instance doctrine was developed in the Convention system 
in the late 1950s and 1960s.43 In the Belgian Linguistic case, the Court 
held that: 
 
It […] cannot assume the role of the competent national authorities, 
                                                            
41 See Letsas (n 16); Harris and others (n 10), 7-21; Clara Ovey and Robin CA White, 
in Jacobs & White, The European Convention on Human Rights (5th edn; OUP 2010), 
73-8; Christoffersen (n 2), 54-63; Gerards (n 19), 428-35; Alistair Mowbray, ‘Between 
the Will of the Contracting Parties and the Needs of Today: Extending the Scope of 
Convention Rights and Freedoms beyond Could Have Been Foreseen by the 
Drafters of the ECHR’, in Eva Brems and Janneke Gerards (eds), Shaping Rights in 
the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of 
Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2013), 17-37. 
42 Christoffersen (n 2), 49-50; Alex Stone Sweet, ‘A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: 
Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe’ (2012) 1 Global 
Constitutionalism 53, 73. 
43 See eg X v Belgium, 458/59, 29 March 1960. See more Christoffersen (n 2), 238-9, 
274.  
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for it would thereby lose sight of the subsidiarity nature of the 
international machinery […] The national authorities remain free to 
choose the measures which they consider appropriate […] Review by 
the Court concerns only the conformity of these measures with the 
requirements of the Convention.44  
 
The Court adopted the Commission’s approach in the 1970s, and in its 
leading case Schenk,45 the Court stated the following: 
 
According to Article 19 of the Convention, the Court’s duty is to 
ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the 
Contracting States in the Convention. In particular, it is not its 
function to deal with errors of fact or of law allegedly committed by a 
national court unless and insofar as they may have infringed rights 
and freedoms protected by the Convention.46 
 
The fourth instance doctrine stems from two main sources. Firstly, it is 
a simple matter of efficiency in the use of resources. Secondly, at the 
level of legitimacy, it is recognised that democratically non-accountable 
judges in Strasbourg should not use their jurisdiction to override 
national authorities.47  The main rule is clear: the facts of the case 
brought before the Court will not be questioned. This means in 
practice that the Court accepts that the national authorities investigate 
the facts of the case. However, if the national court’s decision violates 
the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention then it is 
necessary for the Court to step in.48 
 
In addition to upholding national sovereignty, the fourth instance 
                                                            
44 Case ‘Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in 
Belgium’ v Belgium (Merits) (Belgium Linguistic case), 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 
1994/63, 2126/64, 23 July 1968, para 10. 
45 Schenk v Switzerland, 10862/84, 12 July 1988. 
46 ibid, para 45. For more recent case law, see, eg Tautkus v Lithuania (n 11), in which 
the Court emphasised that it is not the task of the Court to assess the facts which 
led a national court to adopt one decision over another. The application of the 
fourth instance doctrine also means that an applicant’s argument that was not 
accepted by the national court cannot be upheld by the Court (para 57). 
47 Arai-Takahashi (n 3), 235-6. 
48 Ben Emmerson, Andrew Ashworth and Alison Macdonald (eds), Human Rights and 
Criminal Justice (3rd edn; Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 129, 134, 645; Andreas Føllesdal, 
Birgit Peters and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Introduction’, in Andreas Føllesdal, Birgit Peters 
and Geir Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe, The European Court of Human Rights in a 
National, European and Global Context (Cambridge University Press 2013), 15-7. 
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doctrine also respects the principle of democracy. Respecting the 
choices and evaluations made by the national authorities reflects 
respect for the democratically elected members of the parliament and 
the people who have democratically voted for their representatives.49 
The Preamble to the Convention states that on the one hand, 
fundamental rights and freedoms are best maintained by an effective 
political democracy and, on the other, by a common understanding 
and observance of the human rights upon which they depend.50 
 
The Court frequently reiterates that it is not its role to act as quasi-
appellate court as to the correctness of a national court’s judgment 
under its national law.51 Unlike a national court of appeal, it is not 
concerned about whether the conviction was safe, whether the 
sentence was appropriate, or whether the level of damages awarded 
was in accordance with national law, and so forth. 52  However, 
questions relating to the fairness of the domestic proceedings under 
Article 6 of the Convention blur the lines. 
The Court has considered that insofar as the remaining ‘fairness’ 
complaints under Article 6 have been substantiated, this raises issues 
that are of no more than a fourth instance nature, and which the Court 
has limited power to review under Article 6.53 For example, if the 
Court considers the domestic court failed to consider certain factors 
when assessing the legal nature of the case, it risks going beyond its 
                                                            
49  Judicial minimalism has the same aim and affect: judging narrowly and 
superficially leaves things open for further decision in the future. This also 
promotes democracy: by saying no more than is strictly necessary, minimalism 
leaves issues open for political discussion. For further discussion of the Court’s 
judicial minimalism, see Aagje Ieven, ‘Privacy Rights in Conflict: In Search of the 
Theoretical Framework behind the European Court of Human Rights’ Balancing of 
Private Life against Other Rights’ in Eva Brems (ed), Conflicts Between Fundamental 
Rights (Intersentia 2008), 55-60. 
50 See more Alistair Mowbray, ‘The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in 
the Promotion of Democracy’, (1999) 51 PL 703; Susan Marks, ‘The European 
Convention on Human Rights and its “Democratic Society”’, (1995) 66 BYIL 209. 
51 See eg Pelipenko v Russia, 69037/10, 1 October 2012, para 65: ‘the Court reiterates 
that it is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to 
interpret and apply domestic law, even in those fields where the Convention 
“incorporates” the rules of that law, since the national authorities are, by their very 
nature, particularly qualified to settle issues arising in this connection […]’; see also 
Wildhaber (n 20), 162. 
52 For more on this subject, see Ovey and White (n 41), 243. 
53 See García Ruiz v Spain, 30544/96, 12 January 1999, GC, para 28; Fruni v Slovakia, 
8014/07, 21 June 2011, para 128. 
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competence and acting as a court of fourth instance.54 But how can the 
Court evaluate fairness in the first place without, in fact, acting as a 
court of fourth instance? Evaluating the overall fairness of national 
procedure leads the Court to make a concrete assessment of the 
arguments and the application of national laws and their interpretation 
by national authorities. 55  This creates an unclear and confusing 
situation. On the one hand, the starting point is obvious, the national 
authorities play the lead role in investigating and interpreting national 
law. On the other hand, the fact that the Court steps in if the national 
interpretation violates provisions of the Convention muddies the 
waters. In such cases, who is the arbitrator that decides when the line 
is crossed? Questions about the fairness of the proceedings and its 
outcome can be easily assessed by reference to the facts of the case at 
hand. Arguments concerning, for example, the appropriateness of the 
imposed punishment are open to criticism as instances of fourth-
instance assessments. 56  It seems that the fourth instance doctrine 
draws a fine line, whose precise position must be decided by the Court 
on a case-by-case basis. I argue that the doctrine defines the limits 
within which the human rights interpretation can be made. In other 
words, it provides a point of departure for subsequent interpretation. I 
also argue that the Court in some cases acts as a fourth instance 
court.57 
 
III. CASE STUDY: THE ROLE OF THE FOURTH INSTANCE DOCTRINE  
 
 Case Categories 1.
The forty-four cases chosen for the purposes of this study were found 
                                                            
54 See, eg the concurring opinion of judge Dedov in the case of Brežec v Croatia, 
7177/10, 18 July 2013. 
55 It has been pointed out that a question of law and a question of fact are hard to 
distinguish. See the dissenting opinion of judge Zupančič (Hermi v Italy, 18114/02, 18 
October 2006): ‘Here at the European Court of Human Rights we continue to make 
the point that we are not a fourth-instance court and that we do not wish to deal 
with any facts which are subject to the guiding principle of immediacy in a trial. 
Nevertheless, a new major premise in legal terms will always call for new elements 
making up the minor premise, that is, some kind of facts.’  
56 See the concurring opinion of judge Kalaydjieva in the case of Maktouf and 
Damjanović v Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2312/08, 34179/08, 18 July 2012, GC. 
57 Costa considers the fourth instance doctrine to be one of the devices that delimit 
the Court’s domain vis-á-vis national authorities. See Jean-Paul Costa, ‘On the 
Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments’ (2011) 7 EuConst 
173, 179.  
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in the HUDOC database by using the search terms ‘fourth instance’ 
and ‘effective.’ No time limits were applied.58 Based on a close reading 
of the cases, four categories were identified in order to systematically 
categorise the role of the fourth instance doctrine under Article 6. This 
categorisation was carried out by applying the methods of rational 
argumentation theory, which offers a deeper insight into the 
substantive reasons given by the Court. 59  Argument analysis is a 
method that focuses on the Court’s reasoning, which results in the 
researcher moving to the level of legal culture. This allows more 
general remarks to be made about the use of the fourth instance 
doctrine in the Court’s practice.60 
 
The first category is ‘clear fourth instance nature’. Here the Court’s 
task is easy, since one can easily observe that questions before the 
Court are purely fourth-instance-related so the Court is prohibited 
from looking at them. The second category is ‘length of proceedings’. 
Here the Court’s task is relatively straightforward and the Court must 
assess whether the length of the proceedings at national level was 
unreasonable. The third category is ‘balancing approach’. In these 
cases the Court takes the view that it has no grounds to interfere 
because the assessment of the evidence or establishment of the facts 
made by the national courts is not manifestly unreasonable or in any 
way arbitrary. The threshold for interference is relatively high. Here, 
the Court tends to place an emphasis on the fourth instance doctrine 
                                                            
58  The search terms ‘fourth instance’ and ‘effective’ were chosen because they 
helped locate the relevant cases. The word ‘effective’ is widely used by the Court 
both in the practical and effective interpretations as well as in other interpretations, 
such as in positive obligations and living instrument argumentation. See, eg the 
dissenting opinion of judge Kalaydjieva in the case of Dimitar Shopov v Bulgaria, 
17253/07, 16 April 2013, 16. The search terms, however, clearly omit some relevant 
cases, since it would be impossible to apply search terms that would cover all 
potential relevant cases. The task of searching for cases was conducted from 1 
August 2013 until 1 November 2013. 
59 Paso (n 24), 240; Aulis Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal 
Justification (D Reidel Publishing Co 1987). See also Alan McKee, Textual Analysis: A 
Beginner’s Guide (SAGE Publications 2003); see also on discursive analytic research, 
Alexa Hepburn and Jonathan Potter, ‘Discourse Analytic Practice’, in Clive Seale 
and others (eds), Qualitative Research Practice (SAGE Publications 2007), 168-84; 
Ruth Wodak, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, in Clive Seale and others (eds), 
Qualitative Research Practice (SAGE Publications 2007), 185-201.  
60 In respect of the levels of the law, especially on the level of legal culture, see 
Kaarlo Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Ashgate 2002), 161-83. 
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over the right to a fair trial. The fourth category is ‘disregard of fourth 
instance approach’. In the cases belonging to this category, the Court 
emphasises the fair trial provision over the fourth instance doctrine by 
finding positive obligations under Article 6. In these two latter 
categories one can find arguments both for and against the fourth 
instance doctrine and the right to a fair trial. 
 
Based on the results of my search, I have decided to present the most 
representative examples of the role of the fourth instance doctrine in 
each particular category. In other words, these examples are chosen on 
the basis that they best demonstrate the character of the particular 
category at hand. 
 
 Category one: Clear fourth instance nature 2.
These cases almost immediately reveal themselves as falling squarely 
within the fourth instance doctrine and the Court will consider them 
no further. Claims, which are clearly of a fourth instance nature, 
include general claims where there is no suggestion that the national 
court has misinterpreted the domestic legislation or balanced the 
evidence incorrectly. 
  
In Tomić, twelve applicants complained about the decision of the 
domestic court proceedings. 61  The Montenegrin Government 
maintained that these complaints were of a fourth-instance nature and 
therefore inadmissible before the Court. The Court agreed with the 
assessment,62 and it was, therefore, not necessary to justify its decision. 
It sufficed to refer to the fourth instance formula as follows: ‘it is not 
its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a 
national court unless and in so far as they may infringed rights and 
freedoms protected by the Convention’.63 This is a classic example of 
an issue that is clearly a case of the fourth instance doctrine so the 
Court cannot investigate the decision of the national proceedings. 
 
The complex Karpenko case involved several complaints under Article 
                                                            
61 Tomić and Others v Montenegro, 18650/09, 18676/09, 18679/09, 38855/09, 38859/09, 
38883/09, 39589/09, 39592/09, 65365/09, 7316/10, 17 April 2012. 
62 ibid, paras 62-3. 
63 ibid, para 62. In respect of the alleged violation of Article 6 as regards the 
outcome of the proceedings, see also FC Mretebi v Georgia, 38736/04, 31 July 2007, 
paras 31-33. 
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6.64 The applicant alleged that the criminal proceedings, in which he 
was accused of murder, the possession of firearms and forgery charges, 
were unfair as the courts had erred in their assessment of the facts and 
evidence and had incorrectly applied domestic law. The Court 
reiterated that under the fourth instance doctrine its task was not to act 
as a court of appeal or a fourth instance court, and pointed out that it 
is for the domestic courts to exclude evidence it considers irrelevant.65 
It then assessed the evidence on which the charges were based, noting 
that there were multiple documents, witnesses and expert testimonies 
and that the national judgment was well-reasoned. The Court also 
noted that the applicant was present throughout the proceedings and 
was able to cross-examine witnesses and challenge the evidence.66 On 
the basis of these facts, the Court considered that: ‘in so far as the 
remainder of the “fairness” complaints under Article 6... has been 
substantiated, it raises issues which are no more than a fourth-instance 
nature, and which the Court has a limited power to review [...]’67 It 
concluded that this part of the application must be rejected.  
 
Fruni dealt with the impartiality and independence of the courts.68 The 
applicant complained that he was not granted a fair hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law, as provided for 
in Article 6(1). More precisely, he complained, inter alia, that his trial 
and conviction was politically motivated, and that the court had taken 
inadmissible evidence into account. The Court went through the 
points of the complaint with reference to the facts of the case, and held 
as follows with respect to the fourth instance doctrine: ‘[T]he 
admission of evidence is a matter for domestic courts. It is also for 
domestic courts to decide what evidence is relevant […]’69  
 
The Court observed that the applicant’s conviction was based on 
extensive documentary, witness and expert evidence, and found 
nothing that undermined the fairness of the procedure. Consequently, 
it rejected the application and observed: ‘in so far as the remainder of 
the “fairness” complaints under Article 6 […] has been substantiated, it 
                                                            
64 Karpenko v Russia, 5605/04, 13 March 2012. Other complaints under Article 6 are 
discussed below. 
65 ibid, para 80. 
66 ibid, para 81. 
67 ibid, para 82. 
68 Fruni v Slovakia (n 53). 
69 ibid, para 126. 
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raises issues which are of no more than a fourth-instance nature’.70 
 
Fair trial provisions were widely invoked in Shalimov.71 The applicant 
complained that the proceedings were unfair, that the domestic courts 
were not impartial and independent, and that they had falsified the 
case materials against him and misinterpreted the evidence. The Court 
reiterated the fourth-instance formula—that it is not its task to act as a 
court of fourth instance—and also noted that the domestic courts are 
best placed to assess the credibility of witnesses and the relevance of 
evidence.72 The applicant had not substantiated any of the allegations. 
The Court held that the mere fact that the court had decided against 
the applicant was not sufficient to conclude that it was not impartial 
and not independent.73 There was consequently no balancing issue and 
the case was clear and undisputed. Complaints about the domestic 
court’s interpretations of the evidence provide a fitting example of an 
issue, which, according to the fourth instance doctrine, do not fall 
under the Court’s jurisdiction. 
 
 Category two: Length of proceedings 3.
The length of proceedings amounts to a category of its own in fair trial 
cases. In cases where the national authority has delayed the 
proceedings beyond a reasonable length of time, the Court can, 
irrespective of the doctrine of fourth instance, conclude that the 
national trial has been unfair due to the unreasonableness. In the 
Court evaluation of the length of the proceedings, the heart of the 
fourth instance doctrine remains untouched. The Court’s analysis in 
this regard is rather straightforward: if the length of the proceedings 
was unreasonable, then there is a violation of Article 6(1). There are 
very few problems with this interpretation, and thus these questions 
are rather easy and quick to resolve. 
 
In Sebahattin Evcimen the proceedings before the domestic courts had 
lasted nine years and eight months and took place at two levels of the 
court system.74 The Court’s approach to evaluating the reasonableness 
of the length of the proceedings involved taking into account the 
                                                            
70 ibid, para 128. 
71 Shalimov v Ukraine, 20808/02, 4 March 2010. 
72 ibid, para 67. 
73 ibid, paras 68-9. 
74 Sebahattin Evcimen v Turkey, 31792/06, 23 February 2010. 
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circumstances of the case, its complexity, the conduct of the applicant 
and the relevant authorities, and what was at stake for the applicant in 
the dispute.75 The Court pointed out the obligations of the state: ‘it is 
the role of the domestic courts to manage their proceedings so that 
they are expeditious and effective.’76 Consequently, it concluded that 
the national courts had not acted with due diligence overall, and that 
the Turkish Government had not put forward any facts or arguments 
capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion. Consequently, 
the Court unanimously ruled that the length of the proceedings was 
excessive and failed to meet the reasonable time requirement. 
 
In Shalimov the applicant’s complaint was based on several grounds 
under Article 6, including, inter alia, that the criminal proceedings 
against him had taken an unreasonably long period of time. The 
Court’s evaluation started by reiterating that the reasonableness of the 
length of the proceedings must be assessed in the light of the 
circumstances of the particular case and with reference to the criteria 
as laid down in the Court’s case law.77 The Court then turned to the 
facts of the case, which amounted to criminal proceedings against the 
applicant that took four years, eleven months and three days to 
complete, and included multiple periods during which little or no 
action was taken. It appeared that it had taken more than a year for the 
domestic authorities to conduct additional medical and ballistic 
examinations in the case. Furthermore, no action had been taken 
between the preparatory hearing of 15th of April 2002 and the hearing 
on the merits on 9th of September 2002; a period of almost five months. 
The Court emphatically stressed that:  
 
[S]uch delays are attributed to the domestic authorities and are not 
justified by the complexity of the case or the by the applicant’s 
behaviour. Furthermore, special diligence was required […] given that 
the applicant was in detention during the period in question.78  
 
The Court emphasised that the State was obliged to provide a fair trial 
within reasonable time. I consider this to be purely a fair trial issue and 
questions relating to the fourth instance doctrine are irrelevant. The 
Court concluded that ‘[t]he foregoing considerations are sufficient to 
                                                            
75 ibid, para 30. 
76 ibid, para 32 (emphasis added). 
77 Shalimov v Ukraine (n 71), para 76. 
78 ibid, para 77. 
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enable the Court to conclude that the proceedings… were excessively 
long’.79 
 
 Category three: Balancing approach 4.
This category of cases requires the Court to balance the effectiveness 
of the fair trial provision with the limits imposed by the fourth instance 
doctrine. This is not an easy task to accomplish, since it is possible to 
frame the arguments according to the fourth instance doctrine or the 
practical and effective right to a fair trial. However, the Court 
maintains a relatively high threshold for interference in respect of 
these cases, requiring that the assessment of the evidence or 
establishment of the facts by the national courts may not be ‘manifestly 
unreasonable or in any other way arbitrary’.80 
 
In Tomić, the applicants claimed that the domestic courts violated 
Article 6 in rejecting their claims while at the same time permitting 
identical claims by other applicants.81 They submitted copies of the 
domestic courts’ rulings in six other cases to support their claim. The 
Court’s assessment commenced with the following statement:  
 
[I]t is not its role to question the interpretation of domestic law by the 
national courts. Similarly, it is not [...] its function to compare 
different decisions of national courts, even if given in apparently 
similar proceedings; it must respect the independence of those 
courts.82  
 
The Court indicated the relevant threshold is as follows: 
 
[C]ertain divergences in interpretation could be accepted as an 
inherent trait of any judicial system which […] is based on a network 
of trial and appeal courts […] However, profound and longstanding 
differences in the practice of the highest domestic court may in itself 
be contrary to the principle of legal certainty […]83 
 
                                                            
79 ibid, para 78; see similarly Štavbe v Slovenia, 20526/02, 30 November 2006, paras 
43-44; Josephides v Cyprus, 33761/02, 6 December 2007, paras 71, 76; Christodoulou v 
Cyprus, 30282/06, 16 July 2009, para 59; Richard Anderson v the United Kingdom, 
19859/04, 9 February 2010, para 29. 
80 See eg Ebanks v the United Kingdom, 36822/06, 26 January 2010, para 74. 
81 Tomić and Others v Montenegro (n 61).  
82 ibid, para 53. 
83 ibid, para 53. 
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The Court laid down certain criteria to be followed in order to assess 
whether inconsistent decisions of domestic Supreme Courts violated 
the fair trial requirement under Article 6(1). These criteria comprised 
in establishing whether ‘profound and long-standing differences’ 
existed in the Supreme Court’s case law, whether the domestic 
legislation provided measures to overcome these inconsistencies, and 
whether these measures had been applied and, if appropriate, to what 
effect.84 Next, the Court examined the six national cases, which the 
applicants referred to, and concluded that only three decisions ruled in 
favour of claimants, whose situation was similar to that of the 
applicants. It also noted that the Supreme Court never examined these 
decisions. The Court also examined the case law of the national High 
Court and observed that it had heard a total of eighty-eight appeals, of 
which eighty-four decisions were against the claimants and only four in 
favour. The Court concluded that: ‘It would appear that these four 
favourable decisions could be considered an exception and 
inconsistent in comparison with the other eighty-four, rather than the 
other way round’.85 
 
The Court found some inconsistencies in the national case law, which 
it held could not be seen as ‘profound and long-standing differences’. 
On this basis, it concluded that there was no violation of Article 6(1). 
This case illustrates that the threshold under which inconsistencies in 
national case law may violate the fair trial provision, which I argue has 
been raised relatively high. 
 
The Grand Chamber’s votes were finely balanced in Şahin, in which 
ten judges, with seven dissenting, supported the majority vote.86 The 
key issue in this case was whether the fourth instance doctrine took 
precedence over the  ‘practical and effective’ requirements of Article 
6(1). The majority voted in favour of the fourth instance doctrine, with 
the dissenting opinion favouring the effectiveness of rights approach. 
The applicants claimed that the proceedings before the domestic 
courts were unfair and argued that it was possible that the same facts 
could give rise to different legal assessments that varied from one court 
to another, which amounted to a violation of Article 6(1). 
The facts of the case were that there had been a military plane crash 
                                                            
84 ibid, para 54. 
85 ibid, para 57. 
86 Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v Turkey, 13279/05, 20 October 2011, GC. 
105   European Journal of Legal Studies                [Vol.7 No.2 
 
 
and the courts awarded some, but not all, of the victims’ families a 
pension. The majority of the judges of the Court held that the fourth 
instance doctrine was the decisive principle,87 and the Court reiterated 
on several occasions that a conflict in national case law does not 
automatically result in a violation of Article 6(1).88 It emphasised that it 
had found no evidence of arbitrariness, stating that: 
 
[E]xamining the existence and the impact of such conflicting decisions 
does not mean examining the wisdom of the approach the domestic 
courts have chosen to take […] its role […] is limited to cases where 
the impugned decision is manifestly arbitrary.89  
 
The Court concluded that the ‘interpretation made by the Supreme 
Military Administrative Court […] cannot be said to have been arbitrary, 
unreasonable or capable of affecting the fairness of the proceedings, 
but was simply a case of application of the domestic law’.90 Finally it 
stressed its role: ‘it must avoid any unjustified interference in the 
exercise by the States of their judicial functions or in the organisation 
of the judicial systems’.91 The majority held that there had been no 
violation of Article 6(1).  
 
The dissenting opinion stressed that different interpretations must not 
place the public in a situation of legal uncertainty, where the outcome 
of a case is dependent on a mechanism incapable of guaranteeing 
consistency in court decisions.92 It prioritised the requirement of a fair 
trial and had little to say about the question of subsidiarity in the 
case.93 By contrast, the majority view emphasised the formal aspects of 
the fourth instance doctrine. However, the dissenting opinion 
neglected to address how the fair trial provision must be interpreted in 
light of the Preamble to the Convention, which declares the rule of law 
is part of the common heritage of the Contracting States. One of the 
fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal 
                                                            
87 ibid, paras 49-50, 68-70, 88. 
88 ibid, paras 51, 88. 
89 ibid, para 89. 
90 ibid, para 93. 
91 ibid, para 94. 
92 Joint dissenting opinion of judges Bratza, Casadevall, Vajić, Spielmann, Rozakis, 
Kovler and Mijović in Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v Turkey (2011), para 6. 
93 ibid, para 5. See the similarly dissenting opinion of judge Šikuta joined by judge 
Myjer in Popivčák v Slovakia, 13665/07, 6 December 2011, para 12: ‘[T]his is not a 
fourth-instance case but rather a case of lack of access to a court […]’. 
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certainty. 94  The Preamble to the Convention also recognises the 
democracy principle, which means that respecting the evaluation made 
by the national authorities entails respect for the democratically 
elected members of parliament. The fourth instance doctrine, among 
other things, ultimately serves this democracy principle.  
 
Based on my reading of the majority’s decision, the judges were 
determined to uphold the independence of the national court at all 
costs. Even taking into account the constitutive principles of the fourth 
instance doctrine, I argue that the decision was unacceptable because 
it essentially pronounces that the national court’s decision on the same 
matter may differ from chamber to chamber of the same court. The 
majority was of the view was that this was neither arbitrary nor likely to 
affect public confidence. 
 
In Sebahattin Evcimen questions about the fairness of the hearing 
arose.95 Fairness entails giving each party a reasonable opportunity to 
present his or her case and to have knowledge of and the right to 
comment on all evidence adduced or observations submitted. The 
applicant complained that he had not received a fair hearing, arguing 
that the domestic courts had erred in the establishment of the facts 
and in their interpretation of the law. More precisely, the applicant 
claimed that the national decision was based on insufficient evidence. 
The Court reiterated the fourth instance formula:  
 
[I]t is not its task to act as a court of appeal or, as is sometimes said, as 
a court of fourth instance, for the decisions of domestic courts [...] the 
latter are best placed to assess the credibility of witnesses and the 
relevance of evidence to the issues in the case.96  
 
Taking a strict approach to the fourth instance doctrine, the Court, 
after examining the facts of the case, decided as follows:  
 
Following a thorough examination of the case file, the Court finds no 
element which might lead it to conclude that the domestic court acted 
in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner in establishing the facts or 
interpreting the domestic law.97 
                                                            
94 Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v Turkey (n 86), para 57. 
95 Sebahattin Evcimen v Turkey (n 74). 
96 ibid, para 25. 
97 ibid, para 26 (emphasis added). 
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The complaint was manifestly ill-founded and was accordingly rejected. 
The Court’s wording indicates that the Court was critical of the 
domestic proceedings; otherwise, the Court would have referred to the 
clear fourth-instance formula. A strict approach to the fourth instance 
doctrine sets a relatively high threshold: there must be something so 
manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable in the domestic proceedings for 
the Court to interfere. This required further elucidation, which was 
not forthcoming in this decision. The judgment remained at a general 
level and made no evaluation on the questions of arbitrariness and 
unreasonableness.98 
 
The quality of the evidence used in criminal proceedings was at issue 
in Bykov. 99  The problematic question here was whether the 
proceedings as a whole were fair, taking into account the manner in 
which the evidence was obtained. In this case the Grand Chamber had 
already found a violation of Article 8 (right to private life) in the State 
agents’ covert operation. Evidence against the applicant was obtained 
in a covert operation and was subsequently used in the criminal 
proceedings. The Grand Chamber had to decide whether the evidence 
obtained in violation of Article 8 can be used in the criminal 
proceedings and fulfils the requirements of fairness under Article 6. Its 
decision was not unanimous. The majority, by eleven to six, 
emphasised that the proceedings must be taken as a whole and that 
there had been no violation of Article 6. 100  The Court’s evaluation 
commenced with the reminder that: 
 
its only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations […] it is not 
competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or 
fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it 
considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of 
any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.101 
 
 The Court made the fourth instance doctrine clear by continuing:  
 
It is therefore not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of 
                                                            
98  Cf. Ebanks v the United Kingdom (n 80) where the arbitrariness and 
unreasonableness is better dealt with.  
99 Bykov v Russia, 4378/02, 10 March 2009, GC. 
100 ibid, paras 89-90 and 104. 
101 ibid, para 88 (emphasis added). 
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principle, whether particular types of evidence […] may be admissible 
or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The question […] 
is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the 
evidence was obtained, were fair […]102 
 
After outlining the main principles the Court turned to the facts of the 
case. It addressed the applicant’s claim that the evidence obtained 
from the covert operation breached his defence rights and thus gave 
rise to a violation of the right to a fair trial under Article 6. It also 
noted that the evidence obtained as a result of the covert operation was 
not the sole basis for the applicant’s conviction, and concluded that: 
‘nothing has been shown to support the conclusion that the applicant’s 
defence rights were not properly complied with in respect of the 
evidence adduced or that its evaluation by the domestic courts was 
arbitrary’.103 
 
This case demonstrates the difficulties inherent in evaluating the 
evidence in the domestic proceedings, whilst remaining within the 
limits of the fourth instance doctrine. Furthermore, the way in which 
the Court formulated its decision was, in my opinion, rather 
pretentious. The pretentiousness is revealed when the Court 
underlines that ‘nothing’ has been shown to support the conclusion 
that the applicant’s defence rights were not properly complied with in 
relation to the fair trial standards. Rather than undermining the 
specific circumstances, a violation of Article 8 in such covert 
operations should be evaluated properly in order to assess a possible 
violation of Article 6. The Court remains silent on the issue that the 
covert operation had in itself violated other Convention articles. 104 
Evaluating this argumentation from the fair trial view leads one to 
conclude that the right to a fair trial remains theoretical or merely 
illusory, since the Court certainly had grounds to interfere. 
 
 Category Four: Disregard of Fourth Instance Approach 5.
The cases in this category prioritise the provision of a fair trial over 
fourth instance questions. In Lalmahomed the applicant claimed in the 
domestic proceedings that he should have been acquitted on the 
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of judge Spielmann, and the concurring opinions of judges Rozakis, Tulkens, 
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grounds of mistaken identity.105 The national court dismissed this claim 
as implausible without further investigation and refused leave to 
appeal. The Court reiterated that under Article 6, ‘for the requirements 
of a fair trial to be satisfied, the accused, and indeed the public, must 
be able to understand the judgment or decision that has been given’.106 
It used rather strong language: 
 
[t]he Court cannot overlook the fact that the single-judge chamber of 
the Court of Appeal [...] refused the applicant leave to appeal on the 
ground that he ‘[did] not consider plausible the applicant’s statement 
that his identity details [were] systemically misused by someone else’107 
 
The Court, for its part, considered it more appropriate to deal with the 
matter, having previously highlighted the fourth instance doctrine: ‘as 
long as the resulting decision is based on a full and thorough 
evaluation of the relevant factors […] it will escape the scrutiny of the 
Court’.108 
 
The Court unanimously came to the conclusion that the applicant’s 
claim that his identity had been misused ought not to have been 
discounted without further examination. The national court’s 
judgment violated the fair trial provision as a whole because it failed to 
fully investigate the case. Consequently, there was a violation of Article 
6(1) taken together with Article 6(3)(c).109 This case can be seen as a 
harsh and unfortunate example of a national court’s failure to base its 
judgment on a full and thorough evaluation. Due to neglect at national 
level the Court had no choice but to assume de facto the role of a 
domestic court. 
 
Jovanović dealt with the right to access the courts. 110 The applicant 
complained that his national Supreme Court had arbitrarily refused to 
consider his appeal when he had the right to use this remedy. The 
Court reiterated that Article 6 does not compel states to establish 
courts of appeal. However, if such courts exist the guarantees 
contained in Article 6 must be upheld, inter alia, by ensuring effective 
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access to them. This right is, however, not absolute. Certain limitations 
are permissible, but these must not restrict or reduce a person’s access 
in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is 
impaired. The Court therefore emphasised proportionality.111  
 
The facts of this case were that the national Supreme Court barred the 
applicant from filing an appeal. It ruled without further clarification 
that the assessment of the value of the dispute showed it was clearly 
below the applicable statutory threshold. The Court held that there 
had been an interference with the applicant’s right to access a court 
and proceeded to assess whether this interference had been 
proportionate.112 It placed weight on the fact that the national Supreme 
Court had not held a preliminary hearing. Furthermore, regarding the 
applicant’s alleged procedural errors, the Court emphasised that it was 
the plaintiff and not the applicant who had set an unrealistic value in 
respect of the dispute, which the applicant apparently challenged 
before he had concluded his own response to the claim. The value of 
the dispute was decisive, as there was a certain threshold required for 
the lodging of an appeal on points of law. The applicant was therefore 
entitled to believe that an appeal on points of law would be available to 
him in due course and if necessary. 113  At this juncture, the Court 
showed that it was fully aware of the fourth instance requirements by 
stating as follows: 
 
It is, of course, primarily for the national authorities, notably the 
courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. 
The Court’s role is not, save in the event of evident arbitrariness, to 
question it.114  
 
The Court then diverged from the strict fourth instance limits by 
giving guidance to the national court on how to interpret domestic law:  
 
The authorities should respect and apply domestic legislation in a 
foreseeable and consistent manner and the prescribed elements 
                                                            
111 ibid, para 46. 
112 The Court solved the legitimate aim question relatively quickly: the statutory 
threshold for appeals to the Supreme Court is a legitimate procedural requirement 
having regard to the very essence of the Supreme Court’s role to deal only with 
matters of the requisite significance (ibid, para 48). 
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should be sufficiently developed and transparent in practice in order 
to provide legal and procedural certainty […]115  
 
Since there had clearly been shortcomings in terms of transparency 
and legal certainty in the national proceedings, the Court unanimously 
held that there had been a violation of Article 6(1). It is noteworthy that 
the last paragraph of the Court’s judgment stated, while finding a 
violation, that ‘it being understood that it is not this Court’s task to 
determine what the actual outcome of the applicant’s appeal on points 
of law would have been had the Supreme Court accepted to consider it 
on its merits’. 116  While emphatically trying to avoid being a fourth 
instance court, the Court acted to the contrary. It also used rather 
contradictory language in making its decision under Article 41 with 
regard to it not being a court of fourth instance:  
 
The Court reiterates that the most appropriate form of redress for a 
violation of Article 6(1) would be to ensure that the applicant […] is 
put in the position in which he would have been had this provision 
not been disregarded. Consequently, it considers that the most 
appropriate form of redress would be to reconsider the applicant’s 
appeal […]117 
 
The Court’s language here undeniably resembles that of a 
constitutional court: it gives instruction to the national court to 
reconsider the case. As result, this particular case amounts to a 
revelation because it reveals the difficulties involved in interpreting 
procedural rights while staying within the limits of the fourth instance 
doctrine. One or the other must yield, and in this case it was the fourth 
instance doctrine that triumphed. 
 
A positive obligation to put in place a system for enforcement of 
judgments under Article 6 arose in Pelipenko.118 Here, the applicant 
complained that because the bailiffs failed to take any necessary steps 
to enforce the execution of the final judgment against the applicants. 
The Court commenced by reiterating that execution of a judgment 
given by any court must be regarded as an integral part of the ‘trial’ for 
the purpose of Article 6. It then noted that the state has a positive 
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obligation to put in place a system for enforcement of judgments that 
is effective both in law and in practice and ensures their enforcement 
without undue delay. It also stated that: 
 
[W]hen final judgments are issued against ‘private’ defendants, the 
State’s positive obligation consists of providing legal arsenal allowing 
individuals to obtain, from their evading debtors, payment of sums 
awarded by those judgments.119  
 
The Court emphasised that the State’s positive measures must be 
adequate and sufficient. Consequently, when it is established that 
measures taken by the national authorities were adequate and 
sufficient, the state cannot be held responsible for a ‘private’ 
defendant’s failure to pay the judgment debt. The Court also took the 
fourth instance doctrine into account and stated: 
 
The Court […] is not called upon to examine whether the internal 
legal order of the States is capable of guaranteeing the execution of 
judgments given by courts. Indeed, it is for each State to equip itself 
with legal instruments which are adequate and sufficient to ensure the 
fulfilment of positive obligations imposed upon the State […] The 
Court’s only task is to examine whether the measures applied […] were 
adequate and sufficient.120 
 
Considering the facts of the case at hand, the Court unanimously held 
that by refraining from taking such adequate and effective measures for 
several years, as required in order to secure compliance with the 
enforceable judicial decision, the national authorities had violated 
Article 6(1) by depriving its provisions of all useful effect.121 The fourth 
instance formula takes a different form in this case, and highlights one 
of the positive obligations as stipulated in Article 6(1). In essence, the 
Court’s threshold for interference permits the state to choose the 
measures required in order to secure adequate and effective 
enforcement of judicial decisions. This also serves the democracy 
principle.122 
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In Karpenko the applicant complained that he had been denied a fair 
trial. He had not been given an opportunity to publically cross-examine 
the four co-accused, who were alleged accomplices in the robberies for 
which he was charged, because none of four attended the trial or 
testified before the court. 123  The Court first went over the general 
principles relating to the rights of the defendant deriving from the fair 
trial provision, noting that these require that the defendant be given an 
adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness 
testifying against him.124 It then conducted an in-depth assessment of 
all the statements given in the pre-trial stage by ten witnesses, in a 
relatively similar manner to that of the appellate court. 125  The 
applicant’s conviction was based, to a decisive extent, on two of the 
witness statements given at the pre-trial stage. The Court remained 
unconvinced by the Russian Government’s arguments as to why the 
witnesses were not present at trial.126 It considered the national court’s 
reasons to be superficial and uncritical, thereby alluding to a positive 
obligation under Article 6:  
 
[T]o take positive steps, in particular, to enable the accused to examine 
or have examined witnesses against him. Such measures form a part of 
the diligence which the Contracting States must exercise in order to 
ensure that the rights guaranteed by Article 6 are enjoyed in an 
effective manner […]127 
  
The choice of words by the Court was robust and unambiguous. After 
framing the positive obligation under the effectiveness principle, it 
ruled that the national court’s decision to justify the witnesses’ absence 
was not sufficiently convincing and that the authorities had failed to 
take reasonable measures to secure their attendance at trial.128 It ruled 
that the applicant had not been granted a fair trial and that as a result, 
there was a violation of Article 6(1) when read with Article 6(3)(d). 
                                                                                                                                                                           
appreciation doctrine. See Harris and others (n 10) 16. 
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126 The Court stated that: ‘[it] has serious doubts as to whether the Town Court’s 
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The applicant had also complained under Article 6 that the national 
courts refused to ensure his attendance in proceedings concerning his 
parental rights. The Court paid particular attention to the nature of the 
dispute in this particular case, which concerned the termination of 
parental rights that required assessment of the very special legal and 
factual relationship existing between a parent and a child.129 The Court 
commenced by reiterating that the principles of adversarial 
proceedings and equality of arms, which are elements of a fair hearing, 
require that each party be given a reasonable opportunity to have 
knowledge of and comment on the observations made or evidence 
adduced by the other party.130 However, it pointed out that in non-
criminal matters there is no absolute right for a parent to be present at 
trial, except with respect to a limited category of cases, such as trials 
where the character and lifestyle of the person concerned are directly 
relevant to the substance of the case, or where the decision involves 
the person’s conduct.131 The Court referred to effectiveness, stating that 
it was ‘not convinced that the representative’s appearance before the 
courts secures an effective, proper and satisfactory presentation of the 
applicant’s case’. 132 Finally, it held, again emphasising effectiveness, 
that ‘the domestic courts deprived the applicant of the opportunity to 
present his case effectively’.133 Consequently, there had been a violation 
of Article 6(1). The Court refrained from ruling on the fourth instance 
doctrine. 
 
In FC Mretebi, the applicant’s complaint to the Court was that its 
national Supreme Court had refused to waive the excessive court fees, 
thus denying him access to justice, which, in turn, violated Article 6.134 
The Court handed down a judgment, following a close vote of four to 
three. The majority took the view that the applicant was obliged, in 
effect, to abandon its appeal before the Court of Cassation because he 
was unable to pay the court fees. The question was whether these court 
fees restricted the right to access to justice disproportionately. The 
Court noted that the national Supreme Court had given no reason as 
to why it could not waive the fees, and ruled that: 
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[A]ssessing the facts of the case as a whole, the Court concludes that 
the Supreme Court failed to secure a proper balance between, on the 
one hand, the interests of the State in securing reasonable court fees 
and, on the other hand, the interests of the applicant in vindicating its 
claim through the courts.135  
 
The dissenting opinion stressed the Court’s role and criticised the 
majority’s reasoning: 
 
It is not for our Court to impose on national jurisdictions ‘to request 
parties more information’ or ‘to try to obtain, either from the 
applicant or the competent authorities, any supplementary proof’ in 
the examination of a civil case.136  
 
The dissenting opinion viewed the case from the fourth instance 
perspective and therefore came to the opposite conclusion. This case 
clearly demonstrates the way in which the Court acts de facto as a court 
of fourth instance. It imposes obligations on national jurisdictions to 
request parties to provide more information and to obtain 
supplementary proof in the trial of civil cases. However, the dissenting 
opinion also proceeded to evaluate questions of a fourth-instance 
nature, asking whether there was sufficient evidence to prove the 
applicant’s insolvency.137 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS  
 
The Court’s argumentation concerning the fourth instance doctrine in 
the first two categories – ‘clear fourth instance nature’ and ‘length of 
proceedings’ – is well-defined and unproblematic from the justifiability 
position. Issues which are clearly of a fourth instance nature should be 
ruled inadmissible. In these cases, arguments concerning the fair trial 
provision have little weight. Issues concerning the length of the 
proceedings are also clear. There is little to weigh up in order to 
determine that the length of the proceedings was unreasonable, since a 
decision by the Court that proceedings took too long does not go to the 
heart of the fourth instance doctrine.  
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The next two categories – ‘balancing approach’ and ‘disregard of 
fourth instance approach’ – reveal the tensions and problems involved 
in balancing the fourth instance doctrine against an expansive 
approach to the interpretation of the right to a fair trial. In these cases, 
in particular, the judicial reasoning given must be transparent and take 
account of both sides in order for the judgment to be justifiable and 
convincing. 138 Cases in the category of ‘balancing approach’ can be 
criticised on the basis that rights should be practical and effective and 
that the provision under Article 6 should be interpreted more 
dynamically. In contrast, cases in the category of ‘disregard of fourth 
instance approach’ can be criticised from the fourth instance doctrine 
and formal legitimacy perspectives. The fourth category also 
demonstrates how the Court occasionally acts de facto as a court of 
fourth instance. On the one hand, the Court is very strict in the way it 
articulates its role, according to which it is not a fourth instance court 
and it is not its task to evaluate the national court’s findings or 
interpretations. On the other hand, its case law shows that the Court 
has been rather active and bold in investigating and broadening the 
obligations and rights laid down in Article 6. For example, it has stated 
that as long as the national decision is based on a full and thorough 
evaluation, it will not interfere.139  
 
Article 6 is a relatively sensitive provision because it requires legal 
proceedings to be fair in the broadest sense of the word but it is the 
national authorities themselves that are responsible for these 
proceedings. In the same way as other Convention articles, Article 6 is 
interpreted dynamically and effectively. The tension lies in the fact that 
in evaluating the fairness of proceedings, the Court cannot avoid 
evaluating the acts and interpretations of the national authorities. In so 
doing, the Court may inevitably find itself fulfilling the role of a fourth 
instance or even a constitutional court. For example, its ruling in 
Jovanović, in which it reiterated that the most appropriate form of 
redress for violation of Article 6 is to ensure that the national court 
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reconsiders the applicant’s appeal, the Court used language typical of a 
constitutional court.140 
 
Karpenko and Pelipenko are interesting examples as they demonstrate 
the way in which the Court has unanimously interpreted the fair trial 
provision by emphasising the effectiveness principle as well as the 
positive obligations derived from it.141 There are no explicit signs in the 
Court’s reasoning that it took the fourth instance doctrine into account. 
Its consideration of the statements given by the ten witnesses in 
Karpenko, in particular, show the Court acting in a role similar to that 
of a fourth instance court. 
 
The Court has acknowledged this problem, for instance in the Grand 
Chamber’s approach in Şahin,142 which divided the judges into two blocs. 
The majority emphasised a strict approach to the fourth-instance formula, 
while the minority stressed public confidence and the effective 
interpretation of the right to a fair trial. Bykov was another Grand 
Chamber case in which the judges’ decision was not unanimous.143 In this 
case the majority placed greater weight on a strict approach to the fourth-
instance formula, and the minority argued that the right to a fair trial 
must be interpreted in such a way as to give effect to this right.144 
 
In my opinion, it is obvious that the Court cannot both strictly avoid 
acting as a fourth instance court and at the same time interpret the right 
to a fair trial provision effectively. Either it should apply a lower 
threshold in cases concerning the fourth instance doctrine and continue 
to interpret Article 6 in an effective manner, or it should stick with its 
strict fourth-instance formula and refrain from interpreting Article 6 in 
an effective way. The latter is by no means desirable or probable as far as 
the protection of human rights is concerned.  
 
Legitimacy arguments can be used to support both possible positions. In 
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the context of the fourth instance doctrine, legitimacy stresses formality 
and the limits placed on the Court’s competence, while the rights 
perspective emphasises substantive legitimacy. From the perspective of 
the latter, legitimacy is gained through the effective protection of human 
rights. It would be more appropriate to consider first how the line should 
be drawn in each case and then openly and transparently give reasons for 
choosing between the fourth instance doctrine and the right to a fair trial. 
One should not forget that the bedrock of the fourth instance doctrine is 
the principle of democracy and national sovereignty. These core 
principles are not articulated by the Court per se but are of fundamental 
importance. For the fourth instance doctrine and its application in the 
Court’s case law to be justified, it requires that all competing interests 
must be taken into account, including pro and contra types of 
argumentation, and are balanced carefully. Furthermore, the underlying 
values should be stated transparently. Owing to the strict and declaratory-
nature of fourth instance doctrine, it does not fulfil these requirements. 
 
Pelipenko indicates a step towards a more flexible and practical approach 
to the fourth instance doctrine, in which the Court interpreted it to mean 
that the state has authority to choose the measures needed to secure 
adequate and effective enforcement of judicial decisions. 145  A strict 
approach to the fourth instance doctrine threatens, in my opinion, the 
effective protection of human rights. If the starting point of legal 
interpretation is dominated by an extremely strict approach to the fourth 
instance doctrine, then it is on the wrong track from the outset.  The 
Court should continue using the fourth instance doctrine in the first two 
approaches: ‘clear fourth instance nature’ and ‘length of proceedings’. 
The last two categories, ‘balancing approach’ and ‘disregard of fourth 
instance approach’ are more critical and complex: the application of the 
fourth instance doctrine is a matter of balancing as well as transparent 
reasoning of the scope of the fourth instance doctrine in relation to the 
effective application of the right at issue. The strict fourth instance 
doctrine, which simply emphasises that there must be ‘something 
arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable’ in the domestic proceedings in 
order the Court to interfere, should not be used at all by the Court.146 
Finally, words such as ‘arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable’ should be 
openly explained and evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
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